In 2006 the UK government announced a move to zero carbon homes by 2016. The demand posed a major challenge to policy makers and construction professionals entailing a protracted process of policy design. The task of giving content to this target is used to explore the role of evidence in the policy process. Whereas much literature on policy and evidence treats evidence as an external input, independent of politics, this paper explores the ongoing mutual constitution of both. Drawing on theories of policy framing and the sociology of classification, the account follows the story of a policy for Zero Carbon Homes from the parameters and values used to specify the target. Particular attention is given to the role of Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) and to the creation of a new policy venue, the Zero Carbon Hub. The analysis underlines the way in which the choices about how to model and measure the aims potentially transforms them, the importance of policy venues for transparency and the role of RIAs in the authorization of particular definitions. A more transparent, open approach to policy formulation is needed in which the framing of evidence is recognized as an integral part of the policy process.
INTRODUCTION
The EU Directive 2002/91/EC on the energy performance of buildings called for the "the application of minimum requirements on the energy performance of new buildings"; a revision of the Directive in 2010 (Directive 2010/31/EU) stated that: "Member States should draw up national plans for increasing the number of nearly zero-energy buildings and regularly report such plans to the Commission." The demand was ambitious, but also extremely ambiguous. Since its introduction, member states have struggled to give content to the concept. In Britain, the focus has been on the formulation of a policy for 'zero carbon homes' from 2016. This paper focuses on the process of 'translating' the UK target into a set of specific objectives. Whereas much of the literature on evidence and policy depicts evidence as an independent, external input, the case of Zero Carbon Homes (ZCHomes) challenges that image. In the case of ZCHomes, the production of evidence was both essential to the specification of policy objectives and publicly contested. To a certain extent, these features reflect the unconventional location of the policy process, as evidenced by its displacement from ministerial offices to a specially created organisation, the Zero Carbon Hub (ZCHub).
But it also points to a more general feature of policy formulation.
From an empirical perspective, the case study poses the questions: "How did the definition of zero carbon homes shift over the course of the policy process?" and "How did the production of evidence contribute to the definition of the policy problem?" From a theoretical perspective, it challenges the tendency in the policy and Energy Construction literature to treat evidence as external and static at the point of use. In their place, it calls for a processual model of the relation between evidence and policy (see below), which pays attention both to the production of evidence and to the "back-and-forthness of policy decision making" (Monaghan, 2010, p.43) . In focusing on the content of the evidence, this paper complements studies of policy makers use of evidence once policies and associated evidence have been finalized (e.g. Simmons, 2015 in this special issue).
The discussion which follows treats the case of ZCHomes as an "extreme" case. The term comes from case study research and refers to instances of a social phenomenon which, while exceptional, may also provide lessons for other cases (Yin, 2009, p.49) . The distinctiveness of the policy for ZCHomes lies in the extent to which the initial aims were underspecified as well as in the break with the usual policy process. The paper begins with a very brief overview of the literature on evidence and policy and the two theories, policy framing and the sociology of classifications, which inform the analysis. This is followed by an account of the specification of the concept of ZCHomes, with a focus on the mutual constitution of policy objectives and evidence over time. The paper concludes with lessons for policy making and research into evidence and policy.
LITERATURE REVIEW Evidence and Policy
Much of the current research on evidence and policy positions the topic in the current political drive for evidence-based policy research (EBPR). This is evident both in political calls for evidence based policy and in trans-national and national requirements for Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs). In the UK, Tony Blair (Prime Minister 1997 promised to modernize the policy process, privileging 'what works'; while David Cameron (Prime Minister 2010 -2015 has called for a professionalization of the public sector, using evidence to make it a leaner, more efficient operation (Botterill & Hindmoor, 2012; Hallsworth, Parker, & Rutter, 2011) . In parallel, the European Commission and many been supported by the creation of formal networks, research institutes, corporate research groups, foundations and governmental organisations (Lenihan, 2013) .
A number of features characterise political and academic discussions of EPBR.
These include: 1. the depiction of evidence as radically distinct from politics, 2. the treatment of evidence as static information which can be adopted or rejected and 3, an almost wistful aspiration to transform policy making into an apolitical rational decision making process and a concurrent acknowledgement that it is not. As Ezrahi (1990) and Porter (1995) have shown, these assumptions can be traced back to an Enlightenment model of politics and are essential to the promise of evidence and data to produce 'better policies'. They can be seen in the linear models of policy development which populate official policy prescriptions (see, for example, the ROAMEF cycle in the UK Treasury's Green Book, Grice, 2011 Grice, /2003 . While this view of evidence has been widely criticized (e.g. Dunlop, 2010; Head, 2010; , it continues to inform the research agenda around policy and evidence in subtle ways. This can be seen in calls to improve the quality of data through new and improved methods and the implicit assumption that better knowledge will minimize the gap between policy and outcomes.
Without contesting these claims, this paper argues that social and political factors are also always present and need to be taken into account in discussions of policies and initiatives for the built environment.
The contribution of 'processual models' to the analysis of evidence and policy lies in their potential to combine technical, social and political considerations in the study of both policy formulation and evidence production. This approach to the study of evidence and policy was suggested by Monhagan (2010) in his work on adversarial policies. In Monhagan's work, the term 'processual' draws attention to the way in which different types of evidence are or are not taken into account in the policy process. This study expands that focus to an examination of the co-production of evidence and policy definitions over time.
Before proceeding, it is helpful to say something about the concept of evidence, or rather policy evidence. Instead of treating evidence as information which is somehow more 'true' or less 'political' than other types of knowledge, this paper defines it as knowledge produced by a particular set of instruments deployed in a particular set of procedures.
Evidence producing instruments and procedures include, amongst others, appraisals, assessments and consultations. This working definition limits the scope of the study to knowledge explicitly produced for a particular policy process (and to the scientific studies which it draws on). It expands the scope of the study from the use of information to the process of its production. In doing so, it shifts the question from: "How does evidence influence policy decisions?" to: "How does the production of evidence overlay and map onto the policy process?" As such it builds on the processual approach identified above, but expands it to include the production and content of the knowledge itself.
Framing and Classifications
The analysis of the policy for Zero Carbon Homes which follows is informed by two related theoretical literatures: political science work on policy framing and sociology of science work on classifications and standards. The concept of 'policy frames' points to variations in the way that specific policy problems are defined and understood by different actors (Rein & Schön, 1996; Schön & Rein, 1995) . The concept has mostly been used to analyse conflicts between actors in the policy process. Policy frames limit the range of options which different actors perceive and entertain. They provide the basis for alliances and coalitions; similarly they explain the failure of different actors to agree. For the purposes of this paper a focus on framing provides a different way to think about the relation of evidence and policy. Instead of focusing on how policy actors use (or fail to use) evidence to make decisions, it draws attention to the relation between the way in which policy problems are framed in relevant policy discussions and the way in which they are framed in policy evidence.
The topic of the framing of evidence is addressed by drawing on the sociology of classifications (Bowker & Star, 1999) . This branch of the sociology of science and technology has developed in the past fifteen years. Its relevance for this paper lies in the attention which it draws to the myriad of decisions which go into the production of data. These Similarly, nothing about energy demand dictates that we should focus on individuals rather than households or buildings or even neighbourhoods. The choices depend on the researcher's and policymaker's questions and goals as well as on the context in which the data is produced and the audiences for whom it is being developed. By extension, classifications never capture everything that is relevant about a particular object and they are subject to change.
The second point concerns the consequences of these choices. Classifications matter because they are associated with different behaviours or ways of acting. For example, UK local authorities treat planning applications differently depending on whether the buildings are designated Grade I, Grade II or unlisted -indicators of their cultural / architectural significances and level of statutory protection.
The analysis which follows traces the shifting definition of ZCHomes from the perspective of the categories which were used to specify the target. More specifically, it traces: the different parameters and values which were considered at different points in time, the issues which led to their proposal and adoption (or rejection) and their circulation across different venues and actors. The aim of the analysis is threefold. First, it provides a particular version of the development of the UK policy for ZCHomes. As for any set of events, there is a near infinite way of telling this story. The more detailed the account, the more complicated it appears. By focusing on the circulation of categories, the version presented herein offers a dynamic, yet schematic account. This perspective privileges the overlay of policy formulation and evidence production. As such, it necessarily sacrifices other important aspects. No claims are made about individual level motivations or understandings; nor does the account address the energy performance implications of different definitions of ZCHomes. The second aim of the story is to explore the contribution of a processual model to current reflections on the relation between evidence and policy.
Finally, the exceptional and experimental nature of the policy process in this case provides an opportunity to reflect on lessons for the future integration of policy making and evidence production.
METHODS
The research for this paper focuses on the overlay of three distinct but interrelated analytic levels. These include 1. the ongoing interaction between policy actors, interests, venues and instruments 2. the ongoing specification of policy aims and 3. the production of evidence which accompanied that policy design process. The first provides a basis to reflect on the specificity of the case, and thus the relevance of lessons for other cases. Following the social constructivist assumptions inherent in both theories, it also provides an initial insight into how and why certain categories came to dominate the framing of ZCHomes (although a full account would require additional research). The latter two serve to map the overlay of policy framing and associated categories in the policy and evidence processes.
Social constructivism is a phenomenological approach which begins from the assumption that existing arrangements are the product of past negotiations between people with different knowledge, interests and associated understandings (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) . In the literature on policy framing, this fundamental premise leads to a view of policy frames as the product of ongoing negotiations between actors with different interests. Moreover, it assumes that policy actors' understandings change as a result of engagement with one another. This position calls for a study of the way in which aims and objectives develop over the life of a policy (points one and two above) and the negotiations which produce those changes. Recently, research into the policy process has underlined the role of venues in providing, or precluding, non-traditional actors access to the policy process (e.g. Kaunert & Léonard, 2012) . As the discussion which follows indicates, the creation of the Zero Carbon Hub involved a displacement of the policy process into a new type of venue, thus suggesting the relevance of this analytic concept.
The sociology of classification adds to this approach a particular interest in instruments and the classifications embedded within them. A central premise of this paper is that evidence producing tools, such as consultations and RIAs, play an important role in the introduction and legitimation of the parameters (classifications) which frame policy problems. Viewed from this perspective, policy tools provide a novel and potentially valuable way to study of policy formulation in particular and governance structures more generally (Hood & Margetts, 2007) .
The decision to focus on the development and circulation of formal classifications supports the use of documentary analysis. The approach is widely accepted in policy research (see, for example, Harrington & Morgenstern, 2004; Radaelli, 2005) ; the key feature is the use of publicly available documents as primary sources to reconstruct social processes. In the course of the analysis documents (like other primary sources such as interview transcriptions or written observations) are subject to critical analysis and transformed into processed data. Within organization studies, research which relies on publicly available documents to analyse a particular event is sometimes referred to as 'organizational post mortem' research (Bryman & Bell, 2003; Orton, 1997) .
While documents are often combined with other types of data, they can also be used on their own. This use is particularly appropriate in historical research and in studies which focus on public and thus visible processes and outcomes. In the case of the UK policy for ZCHomes, this approach is appropriate for two reasons. First, the research aim is to trace the circulation of formal (public) classifications, rather than informal processes or individual level motivations and understandings. Secondly, the policy process is this case is extremely well documented. The ZCHub produced an extensive paper trail of progress reports, consultation documents and associated information.
That said, the method dictates the time frame for the study. As the discussion which follows suggests, this paper focuses on the first two phases of the specification of ZCHomes. This is because the third phase was still ongoing at the time of writing, and as such, not amenable to this type of analysis. While this is a limitation in terms of the story, it does not compromise the (more limited) empirical contribution or the more general reflections on the relation between evidence and policy.
Changes in the policy process were tracked through the analysis of numerous documents issued by relevant policy actors. These included formal reports issued by the Report (2007) . While a study of the various meanings which different actors ascribed to these representations would help to explain the content and outcome of specific negotiations, this was not the aim of the paper. In total 87 documents were collected and analysed. The full list of these 87 documents can be found in an Appendix located in a supplementary online file [production editor will provide URL here].
DEFINING ZERO CARBON HOMES
The story of policy formulation for ZCHomes is complex. The discussion which follows presents it from three different perspectives: the policy process, problem definition and RIA. Roughly one month later a policy statement was issued. As this account suggests, policy design was largely an in-house process and was structured around the collection of evidence, followed by an executive decision. External groups, whether external organizations, advisory bodies or people involved in consultation exercises, provided 'evidence' but were not privy to the decision making process.
Policy design for ZCHomes began with a similar, albeit more drawn out process. The problem entered the policy agenda in late 2006 as part of the government's response to the (2006) . One of the impacts of the review was to convince the government (and others) that it was far less costly to act on climate change than to do nothing. Less than a month later, Gordon Brown (in his role as Chancellor of the Exchequer) used his pre-budget speech to announce that until 2012 all new zerocarbon homes built and sold for under £500,000 would be exempt from stamp duty. He also announced that within ten years, all new homes will be "zero carbon". While most "we need to set a target now for moving to zero carbon housing within 10 years. We would propose to achieve this in three steps: moving first, in 2010 to a 25% improvement in the energy/carbon performance set in building regulations; then second, in 2013, to a 44% improvement; then, finally, in 2016, to zero carbon. Zero carbon means that, over a year, the net carbon emissions from energy use in the home would be zero." Table 1 , included in the consultation document.
Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change
<Insert Table 1 here>
In terms of this story it is important to note first, that until this point the policy formulation process remained unchanged and secondly, that code levels were all expressed in terms of emission reductions relative to the 2006 Building Regulations, except for code level 6 or zero carbon which had yet to be technically defined. Two issues which were to prove contentious in the future included the inclusion of unregulated energy (i.e. energy consumed by occupants through cooking, washing and electronic appliances) in the specification of carbon/energy levels and the restriction of allowable solutions to renewable energy sources that were physically connected to the unit via 'private wire'.
Policy Process: Part 2
In 2008, a new actor entered the scene and the standard practice for evidence based policy was disrupted. The rupture in the policy process began with an independent review of the house building industry and its ability to deliver low/zero carbon homes. The
Calcutt Review was published in November 2007. In its chapter on zero carbon, Calcutt argued that the scale and pace of the zero carbon policy exceeded "anything that has been achieved, or even attempted, in Europe or (so far as we are aware) anywhere in the world" (Calcutt, 2007, p.89) . While it did not explicitly say so, the cost benefit analysis contained in the report directly challenged the one produced for the DCLG consultation. Nor should this have been surprising given the DCLG's own acknowledgement that the consultation process "showed that there is currently insufficient information available to establish whether the cost benefit analysis carried out is reasonable" (DCLG, 2007a, p.64) .
To help the industry meet the challenge of zero carbon, The Calcutt Review called for the creation of a "delivery unit" located outside of government to oversee implementation of the government's zero carbon homes policy (Calcutt, 2007, p.98) . This The discussion which follows explores the story of this triangular representation (hitherto referred to as 'the triangle'), the overlay of classifications which constitute it and the inclusions, exclusions and path dependencies which it introduced. A central argument in the paper involves the way in which the production of evidence actively affirmed and institutionalized those classifications, thereby contributing the the very definition of the problem they were supposed to assess.
Problem definition: classifying zero carbon
The first hint of a move towards a three (or at times four) part classification of ZCHomes can be found in the Calcutt Review. As the authors noted:
Our view is that the best approach is to require the highest practicable standards of energy efficiency as a first, not a final, recourse. Ideally, remote generation should be taken into account only for discretionary energy uses or on sites where distributed energy generation is, for local or environmental reasons, not feasible. (Calcutt, 2007, p.93) The point was picked up by the UKGBC in their report for the 2016 Task 
Problem definition: the middle tier
With the definition of fabric energy efficiency in place, the ZCHub moved onto the middle tier of the triangle. Once again, they changed the name to better reflect their approach. The middle tier was renamed 'low and zero carbon solutions' and used to refer to carbon reduction associated with renewable technologies. The term 'carbon compliance' was redefined as the carbon reduction (or rather performance level) to be achieved through the bottom two tiers of the triangle (building fabric AND specified renewable technologies)
(Figure 2).
A key issue for the ZCHub was the government's target of 100% reduction through carbon compliance. As the Hub pointed out to its members, this target effectively called for 150% reduction in carbon emissions relative to 2006 standards (owing to the inclusion of unregulated carbon, which was not addressed by Part L) -a level which would require dramatic changes to building practices and business models.
In July 2009 the DCLG conceded the point and issued a policy document identifying 70% as its preferred option (Healy, 2009) . While the number may seem precise to some, it was not an example of evidence based policy. Instead, the target would seem to have been chosen for being somewhere between the 44% target for 2013 (relative to the 2016 baseline) and zero (an absolute target which was not yet defined but which everyone acknowledged could not be completely covered by the building (carbon compliance) alone.
Far from resolving definitional problems, the specification of 70% only served to shift the problem of policy definition from a definition of the concept of 'zero carbon homes' to the proportion for carbon compliance. On the basis of the technical evidence, the Task Group concluded that the currently proposed 70% improvement over 2006 is not deliverable as a national minimum standard for all dwellings. It would significantly constrain the range of house types (and designs) which could be built and the locations where they could be built. In particular, it would inhibit the building of apartments.
(ZCH, 2010, p.8)
Instead, the report recommended a range of targets for the 'built performance' emissions from new homes, by type. These included:
• 10 kg CO 2 e/m 2 /year for detached houses 2, 3
• 11 kg CO 2 e/m 2 /year for other houses (semi-detached, terraced etc)
• 14 kg CO 2 e/m 2 /year for low rise apartment blocks (ZCH, 2010, p.8).
The ZCH metrics differed from the DCLG ones in a number of ways. First, they substituted the DCLG's reliance on performance as designed with performance as built. Moreover, an examination of the modeling used to support the thresholds suggests that they were partly linked to assumptions about the technology mix. Officially, the ZCHub's call for variations in the carbon emissions target by house type was presented as neutral with regard to the choice of technology. In practice, the distinction between terraced and non-terraced homes and apartment buildings suggests that computer modelling was based on the use of photovoltaic (PV) panel to roof area ratios to assess the feasibility of different carbon compliance thresholds (Lees & Sexton, 2013) . In contrast to the situation with FEES, where the government adopted the ZCHub's recommendations almost immediately and without amendment, in the case of carbon compliance things moved more slowly. This can partly be ascribed to the change of government in 2010 and the new Treasurer Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne's concern that the aim of 'zero carbon' went too far (Gardiner, 2013; Nichols, 2011; Webb & Harvey, 2011) . However, Regulatory Impact Assessments are widely used appraisal instruments in Europe and Northern America. Amongst EU countries, Britain has gone the furthest in the production of RIAs (Radaelli, 2009 ) . RIA is a microeconomic instrument which serves macroeconomic purposes: it multiplies the costs and benefits experienced by an individual firm by the total population of firms. The aim of an RIA is to calculate and compare the cost and benefit of the proposed legislation on affected stakeholders. This is presented in the form of a restricted number of options (often three) with the intention of providing policy makers with the evidence needed to select between them.
Far from a recent development, the use of such tools has a long history: since 1966 UK government departments have been required by law to conduct some form of cost benefit assessments (CBA) on all proposed legislation affecting business or the non-profit sector (Radaelli, 2009 ). In addition, government departments are required to publish RIAs.
In principle, departments are also supposed to provide the public with information on how specific calculations are produced; in practice, the complexity and length of many of the documents (often exceeding 100 pages) leaves them less than transparent. While the introduction of summary sheets has helped address this problem, the assumptions built into the quantification of impacts are generally hidden from immediate view, especially when modelling techniques are used. With these observations in mind, it is interesting to explore the dynamic relation between the changing framing of ZCHomes in the policy process and in the government's preferred evidence base, the RIAs. The research for this paper compared the set of five RIAs produced in the course of this process. The focus of the analysis was on the parameters used to define, measure and cost ZCHomes.
A first observation is that the way that the RIAs measure the societal cost of zero carbon at the national level is fairly consistent across the five documents; however the level of disaggregation presented in each document varies considerably. Some provide little to no evidence for the predicted impact on occupants or homebuilders; others go into great detail. This is accompanied by quite significant oscillations in the calculated additional cost of a ZCHome. The 2009 document calculates the overall additional cost per dwelling to meet the zero carbon homes target at £7-19,000; this is quite a significant band reflecting the extreme uncertainty surrounding the calculations. The 2011 document sets the overall additional cost at £3-8000 (see Table 2 )
<Insert Table 2 If one now asks about the impact of the RIAs on policy design, the answer is more difficult to establish. This is in part due to the complexity (discussed above) and in part due to the mutual constitution of the ZCHub's evidence and that contained in the RIA. The most judicious answer is that it is the wrong question. Scholars of RIAs have spent much time seeking to distinguish between different uses of RIAs, including portraying policy-making as rational, power, management and creating images of accountability (Radaelli, 2010) . Most studies find that RIAs are rarely consulted in policy making. However, this observation overlooks the extent to which they serve to affirm other types of evidence produced in the policy process. In the case of the ZCHub, this would certainly seem to be the case. When it came to decisions about what should happen in 2016, RIAs would seem to have played an important role in authorizing evidence and thereby recommendations coming from the Zero Carbon Hub.
Problem definition: the top tier
With the bottom and middle tiers of the triangle specified, the ZCHub began to apply a now familiar approach to the final top tier of the triangle, labelled 'allowable solutions'. While this development is outside of the formal scope of this paper -in large part because was not yet resolved at the time of writing -a few comments serve to indicate the classificatory and definitional issues involved. As with the lower two tiers, the policy formulation process has been marked by the ongoing production of reports (ZCH, 2011a (ZCH, , 2012 (ZCH, , 2013 official consultation documents (DCLG, 2014 ), RIAs (DCLG, 2013 ,relatively transparent public debates organized by the ZCHub and less visible discussions behind closed doors.
Of all the tiers, the one for allowable solutions is the most novel. The first two tiers involved efforts to reduce the demand for energy through changes to the physical building and the recovery of energy using low and zero carbon technologies. As a problem in policy formulation, the specification of these tiers involved identifying the technical limitations (such as available roof area) and setting an appropriate minimum target that was technically and commercially achievable on the dwelling. Both, it should be noted, are familiar types of problem which the construction industry knows how to address. Thus while the range of possible categories and the level of targets were novel and open, the types of consideration deemed relevant were familiar. In contrast, when it comes to allowable solutions, both the definition of the problem and the range of solutions involve a break with existing ways of thinking.
At the core of the concept is the idea that, through allowable solutions, house builders will be required to pay for the emissions that they were unable to reduce or mitigate through the fabric and technologies. The concept raises many questions, including: Theoretically, the discussion demonstrates the contribution of a theory of framing and sociology of classifications to the study of policy and evidence. The theory of policy framing draws attention to the shifting definitions of the policy problem, namely ZCHomes, and the way in which different definitions were developed and promoted by different actors in the lengthy process of policy design. It also points to the importance of policy venues for both the policy process and the evidence production process. A key shift in the story came with the creation of the ZCHub. The displacement of the policy process from a relatively obscure process within the confines of ministerial departments (albeit with external inputs from consultations and commissioned reports) to a far more public process had a number of effects. First, it involved a far broader range of stakeholders in policy formulation; secondly, it opened to public reflection an otherwise closed process and thirdly, because of this, it shifted the focus of stakeholder engagement from observations on a set of already defined options to negotiation of the parameters and values which informed them. The result, in this instance, was a more "realistic" policy (in the sense of combining substantive commitments to low energy buildings with sensitivity to current commercial constraints).
Turning to the emerging specification of ZCHomes, the sociology of classifications focused attention on the content of the different definitions. More specifically it pointed to the conceptual 'infrastructure' which contributed to the selection of parameters and assignments of values appearing in the different types of evidence in circulation throughout the process. A basic premise in the sociology of classification is that once authorized, this 'topography' of classifications effectively include and exclude particular things from the definition of the problem and set path-dependencies which shape what is imaginable and actionable in the definition, design and implementation of the policy problem.
In the case of the problem of ZCHomes, a number of categories proved to be critical in the framing of the problem. These included: the delineation of the problem into three categories and their representation in a triangle. These included: (fabric) energy efficiency, carbon compliance and an, as of yet not fully defined, category for 'allowable solutions'.
Once introduced the definitions and boundaries (targets and thresholds) which populated the triangle structured the policy design process and the focus of negotiations. It also privileged a fabric first approach to sustainability, which is consistent with both economists' and the industry's interest in starting with the 'low hanging fruit'.
An examination of those discussions also highlighted the introduction of a number of overlapping parameters. A key dimension was the variation of targets by type of house (flats, attached and detached). As indicated above, this dimension is specific to the UK.
While the ZCHub is clear that its recommendations were technology neutral, this dimension would seem to reflect the industry's current preference for solar. As Lees and Sexton(2013) have argued, solar is the only technology where the amount of roof space is relevant for the definition of zero carbon. A second parameter framing the discussion involved the distinction between regulated and unregulated energy. The restriction of the definition of "carbon" to the latter restricted the industry's responsibility to aspects of energy use over which they have some influence; it also significantly watered down the ambitions of the initial proposal. Finally, the definition of carbon is striking for what was discussed as well as what was not discussed. Nowhere in the documents is embodied carbon even mentioned.
CONCLUSION
In closing it is helpful to reflect on the contribution of this paper to the themes of "Who frames it?" where framing is seen as an ongoing process rather than a one time act.
In response to the question: "Can the processes and assumptions underpinning selection of options be made more transparent?" The answer this paper offers is yes, but only if the focus shifts from the selection of options to their formulation
When it comes to RIAs, the case of ZCHomes adds to a growing body of evidence regarding the frequent irrelevance of these documents for actual policy decisions Meuwese, 2008; Torriti & Lofstedt, 2012) . Far from suggesting that this type of exercise be eliminated, the analysis highlights the conditions under which RIAs and cost benefit analyses may or may not matter. The closer the parameters framing the policy goals are to those figuring in the RIA, the more likely they are to influence policy decisions.
In the same way that current views of evidence would benefit from recognition of the mutual constitution of policy frames and evidence frames, so too policymakers views of RIAs would benefit from greater awareness of the origin and content of key assumptions.
Finally, it is important to underline the limitations of this study. As indicated above, the paper focuses on one aspect of the evidence-policy relation, namely the circulation of categories across policy and evidence frames. Given the complexity of the case, documentary analysis was limited to the policy for ZCHomes in its narrowest sense. The study also focused on the first two tiers of the triangle. Two considerations informed that decision. First, decisions surrounding these tiers were completed at the time of the analysis and thus amenable to documentary analysis. Secondly, both tiers (fabric and renewable technologies) engaged the physical structure of the home and as such, they involved "simpler" problems, at least for construction professionals. The third phase, allowable solutions, involves financial and market mechanisms, with the far greater openness which this implies.
A third issue concerns the specificity of this case. While the case of zero carbon homes may be unusual in the initial under-specification of the policy aim, the reliance on operational definitions to give content to broader policy goals is not. Much of the current agenda for low carbon and sustainable construction involves highly abstract, ill defined goals whose content is specified through the framing of evidence, objectives and even As for the policy process, the case of ZCHomes (and of the ZCHub) is indeed unique;
but not necessarily irrelevant to reflection on evidence and policy more generally. One of the unintended consequences of a rupture in the standard policy process was to subject some of the implicit assumptions in the DCLG's initial framing of the problem and in the RIAs to to critical scrutiny, thereby making them visible. Far from a posing a problem this would seem to be a great achievement. In terms of lessons learned, the key point is not that policy makers need to work harder to produce more objective evidence but rather that they need to render it more transparent and bring it more visibly and critically into the policy process, recognizing the power of underlying classifications.
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